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SUMMARY
We used a mathematical model to describe a regional outbreak and extrapolate the underlying
health-service resource needs. This model was designed to (i) estimate resource gaps and
quantities of resources needed, (ii) show the eﬀect of resource gaps, and (iii) highlight which
particular resources should be improved. We ran the model, parameterized with data from the
2009 H1N1v pandemic, for two provinces in Thailand. The predicted number of preventable
deaths due to resource shortcomings and the actual resource needs are presented for two
provinces and for Thailand as a whole. The model highlights the potentially huge impact of
health-system resource availability and of resource gaps on health outcomes during a pandemic
and provides a means to indicate where eﬀorts should be concentrated to eﬀectively improve
pandemic response programmes.
Key words : Health policy, health-service resources, inﬂuenza A, pandemic preparedness,
theoretical model.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years substantial progress has been made by
many countries to improve their pandemic inﬂuenza
response plans [1–3]. However, with the current
H1N1v pandemic, and sporadic human cases of
H5N1 cases still occurring in South East Asia, pan-
demic preparedness has become an issue of daily
public-health policy, testing the operability of
strategic response plans. The level of pandemic pre-
paredness has direct impact on the eﬀectiveness of
local as well as global disease control. Furthermore,
local health services are challenged since they have
to provide appropriate treatment, especially to an in-
creasing number of severe inﬂuenza cases needing
intensive care [4–6]. Developing countries may be
particularly taxed by scarce resources in the event of a
pandemic since they are often confronted with limited
healthcare capacities [7]. Thus, data about resource
needs, resource gaps and the best way to improve
outbreak response are important to practically sup-
port local policy-makers in pandemic planning.
In support of preparedness, simulation exercises
have been applied to test operational pandemic
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response and to evaluate whether resources are suf-
ﬁcient to control disease spread [8–13]. In addition,
computer programs exist to estimate the dynamics of
a potential pandemic outbreak and to analyse the
impact of intervention measures to guide response
planning [14, 15]. However, many of these simulation
exercises and programs do not explicitly address
resource availability or determine the public-health
impact of resource gaps. Important questions thus re-
main as to whether strategic planning is adequate for
potential outbreak mitigation or control and about
eﬀective options to improve pandemic response, es-
pecially in resource-poor settings.
The aim of this study was to develop a simulation
model designed for local policy-makers in low- and
middle-income countries to estimate the characteristic
of a possible pandemic inﬂuenza outbreak within a
deﬁned population. These results build the basis for
calculating the health-system resource needs, for
identifying potential resource gaps and for pointing
out eﬀective options for improving resource ca-
pacities.
METHODS
We developed a mathematical model to describe a
pandemic inﬂuenza outbreak under diﬀerent assump-
tions about resource availability. Feedback loops
within the model account for the eﬀect of resource
depletion on the expected disease burden and on
the expected mortality rate, and to consequently cal-
culate the actual quantities of resources needed. The
impacts of the available quantities of antiviral drugs
(AVs), vaccines, hospital beds and medical ventilators
are considered in the model. To subsequently estimate
the quantities of personal protective equipment (PPE)
and number of health personnel needed, the model
output is linked to per capita resource needs.
For demonstration purpose the model was applied
to two provinces in Thailand to answer the following
questions: (i) how would a pandemic inﬂuenza out-
break progress given the available resources?, (ii) what
would be the actual resource required for treating
cases according to their disease status?, and (iii) what
magnitude of disease burden could be prevented by
improving the availability of diﬀerent resources?
The mathematical model
We used a deterministic SEIR model (Susceptible–
Exposed–Infectious–Removed) without age structure
assuming a homogeneously mixing population [16].
We extended this baseline model by subdividing
the infected population into groups representing dif-
ferences in clinical severity. We distinguished between
asymptomatic cases which are infectious without
showing signiﬁcant symptoms, mild outpatients
seeking medical care that can be treated at home, and
critical cases in need of hospitalization.
For the model it is assumed that the available
quantities of AV treatment courses, hospital beds and
medical ventilators have an impact on the number of
deaths and the speed of recovery and hence the num-
ber of new cases generated during the outbreak. To
calculate the eﬀect of AV treatment the two sympto-
matically infected groups are further subdivided into
those receiving AVs and those who do not. Treatment
with AVs is assumed to reduce the infectious period
and the probability of death. To describe the eﬀects of
hospital resource shortcomings the group of critically
ill cases is stratiﬁed into hospitalized cases (critical
cases are assumed to be treated in hospital as long as
hospital beds are available, otherwise they become
critical outpatients), ventilated cases (critical cases
needing mechanical ventilation receive ventilation as
long as ventilators are available; cases needing venti-
lation who do not receiving it will die) and critical
outpatients treated at home with and without AV.
For these groups diﬀerent death rates and diﬀerent
infectious periods apply according to their level of
disease severity and according to the quality of treat-
ment they receive.
The model allows the eﬀect of additional inﬂuenza-
relevant intervention measures to be estimated, in
particular, hospital interventions (e.g. infection con-
trol measures) which reduce transmission within the
hospital setting; reduction of contact rates in the
community for a deﬁned period of time; and vacci-
nation campaigns that move a proportion of suscep-
tible individuals who are eﬀectively vaccinated to the
recovered compartment.
The ﬂow of cases throughout the calculated out-
break is deﬁned by 17 diﬀerential equations linking
the diﬀerent model compartments. A simpliﬁed com-
partment ﬂowchart illustrating the overall model
structure is given in Figure 1.
The underlying disease-speciﬁc parameters used are
based on literature published on pandemic inﬂuenza
H1N1v. In the model the individual infectivity is set
to a ﬁxed parameter. Thus, all cases, regardless of the
severity group they belong to, are equally infectious
throughout their period of infectivity. However, the
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duration of infectivity is assumed to vary between
diﬀerent severity groups. These parameters are ad-
justed according to the model’s basic reproduction
number (R0) (the average number of new cases gen-
erated by one infected case, during the time of infec-
tivity in a totally susceptible population, when no
intervention measures are in place [17]) in order to be
consistent with estimations for the current H1N1
pandemic. Under the parameter values chosen, R0 of
the simulated outbreak was 1.32 which is in line with
currently published values [18, 19].
The model and the linked resource calculator
were programmed in MS Excel (Microsoft, USA).
A detailed description of the model structure, the
model formulae, and the parameter settings used are
given in the online Supplementary material.
Health-service resource calculation
Further hospital resource needs are calculated from
the model output by linking per capita resource de-
mands with the observed number of cases within the
underlying case severity groups. Thus, numbers of
hospital personnel needed are calculated from the
peak number of observed hospitalized cases in order
to estimate the human capacity needed to maintain
services during the outbreak peak. For this study it is
assumed that the total number of clinical personnel is
divided into two day shifts and one night shift. During
the day and night shifts on an infectious disease ward,
one nurse can care for ﬁve and ten cases, and one
physician can care for 10 and 40 cases, respectively.
For the treatment of ventilated cases it is assumed
that during day and night shifts, one nurse can care
for one and two patients, respectively, while one
physician can care for four cases in either shift. The
need for PPE is calculated from the total number of
hospitalized cases which occurred throughout the
outbreak period in order to estimate the absolute re-
source quantities needed. Resource depletion per
hospital case throughout the hospital stay for surgical
masks, N95 respirators and surgical gloves are 30, 10
and 40 per common hospital case and 80, 20 and 100
per ventilated case, respectively. The parameters ap-
plied for these depletion rates were based on a review
of inﬂuenza case records and on interviews with pub-
lic health professionals in Thailand carried out for a
previous resource characterization study [20].
Health-service resource survey
The data used for running the model for the Thai
provinces was gathered for a resource characteriz-
ation survey conducted in summer 2009. For this
study questionnaires were sent out to local hospitals,
health service providers and local public health auth-
orities at district level to assess the available resource
quantities relevant for surveillance, case investigation,
case treatment and community containment. Missing
data were extrapolated via a two-stage regression
model based on population size, provider type, and
size of facilities. This analysis was part of a larger
study applied across six Asian countries within the
AsiaFluCap project (www.asiaﬂucap.org).
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Fig. 1. Schematic compartment ﬂowchart of the SEIR
model for pandemic inﬂuenza transmission. Compartment
deﬁnition : S, susceptible to inﬂuenza infection; E, infected
yet not infectious ; A, infectious yet not symptomatic ; Ia,
asymptomatically infectious cases ; Im, mild symptomatic
outpatients who seek medical care [not treated with antiviral
drugs (AVs)] ; Ima, mild symptomatic outpatients under AV
treatment ; Ic, critical outpatients not receiving AVs; Ica,
critical outpatients receiving AVs; Ih, critically ill cases
treated in hospital, under AV treatment as long as stockpile
is suﬃcient ; V, critically ill patients receiving ventilation
if available ; D, deaths due to inﬂuenza complications ;
R, recovered and immune against infection.
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Provinces identiﬁed for this analysis
We ran the model for Phichit and Nakhon Si
Thammarat provinces in Thailand (Fig. 2) represent-
ing two deliberately identiﬁed provinces with diﬀerent
demographic and socioeconomic contextual settings
and also diﬀerent levels of health-service resources
available to respond to pandemic inﬂuenza. Phichit
province in lower north Thailand covers an area of
about 4500 km2 with a population of 554 112 in-
habitants. Agriculture is the province’s most import-
ant economic resource. The gross provincial product
(GPP) in 2004 was 2.2 billion Thai Baht (THB)
or 45 330 THB (yUS$1300) per capita. Nakhon
Si Thammarat province in south Thailand has a
population of 1 513 163 inhabitants and an area size
of about 10 000 km2. The province’s economy is tra-
ditionally based on ﬁshing; however, in recent years
the tourism industry has become more important. The
province’s GPP in 2004 was 9.8 billion THB or 61000
THB (yUS$1800) per capita [21], somewhat higher
than that of Phichit province.
Finally, calculations were performed for all Thai
provinces and the results summarized for Thailand as
a whole. For these calculations, assumptions based on
Thailand’s national strategic response plan were made
as follows [22] : it was assumed that AVs are used to
solely treat critical cases, 20% of hospital beds and
ventilators are available for inﬂuenza cases, measures
for contact reduction decrease the number of daily
contacts by 10%, and contact reduction is applied as
long as a minimum of 0.5% of the population is
symptomatically infected. The latter is based on the
assumption that, during periods of high pandemic
activity, individuals will change their behaviour to
reduce contacts, and/or social distancing measures
such as school closure will be implemented. All
simulations start with one mild case entering a com-
pletely susceptible population.
RESULTS
Running the model in a hypothetical population
without any interventions and assuming suﬃcient
hospital resources showed that 31.33% of the popu-
lation became symptomatically infected over the
course of the outbreak. The peak of the outbreak oc-
curred at day 112, when 1.72% of the population
were symptomatically infected and 0.026% were
hospitalized due to infection. During the course of the
outbreak, 0.012% of the population died. Adding
contact reduction and AV treatment for critical cases
to the described scenario changed the ﬁgures as fol-
lows: 25.08% of the population became infected over
the course of the pandemic, while 0.92% were symp-
tomatically ill and 0.015% were hospitalised at the
outbreak peak. In total, 0.006% of the population
died due to inﬂuenza-related complications, which is a
50% reduction compared to the non-intervention
scenario.
Phichit province has an overall stockpile of 422
antiviral treatment courses, 237 medical ventilators
(both adult and paediatric) and 985 available hospital
beds. Running the model with these data assuming
contact reduction is applied showed that 25.076% of
the population were symptomatically infected. The
Phichit
Nakhon Si Thammarat 
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Fig. 2. Map showing Phichit and Nakon Si Thammarat
provinces in Thailand.
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maximum number of observed symptomatic cases at
any given time-point was 5096 cases (0.919% of
population). During the outbreak period 36 cases died
from inﬂuenza-related complications. The total out-
break lasted for 188 days. The hospital capacity, in-
cluding the number of ventilators, as well as the AV
stockpile was suﬃcient to treat all admitted critical
cases. However, the remaining amount of 25 AV
treatment courses is not suﬃcient to oﬀer treatment to
additional mild cases during the outbreak (Table 1).
A graphical representation of the outbreak scenario is
given in Figure 3a.
Assuming suﬃcient hospital resources, 24 phys-
icians and 64 nurses would be needed per day during
the outbreak peak to treat the estimated number of
inﬂuenza in-patients. The total amount of PPE
needed to treat hospitalized cases was estimated to be:
3000 surgical masks, 900 N95 respirators and 3800
surgical gloves for Phichit province.
Nakhon Si Thammarat has an AV stockpile of 518
treatment courses. Furthermore, 99 medical venti-
lators (both adult and paediatric) and 2642 hospital
beds are available in total. Running the model for
the province showed that 25.079% of the population
became symptomatically infected, with a maximum
number of 13 887 cases (0.917% of population) dur-
ing the outbreak peak. Overall, 183 cases died from
inﬂuenza-related complications. Although the total
outbreak lasted for about 190 days, the model pre-
dicted that the AV stockpile would be depleted by day
Table 1. Modelled pandemic outbreak progression in two Thai provinces
taking into account available health-service resources
Phichit
Province
Nakhom Si
Thammarat
Province
Total population 554 112 1 513 163
Number of symptomatic cases (%) 138 948 (25.08) 379 484 (25.07)
Hospitalized cases (%) 397 (0.07) 1009 (0.07)
Ventilated cases (%) 79 (0.01) 142 (0.01)
Number of deaths (%) 36 (0.01) 183 (0.01)
Deaths due to lack of ventilators (%) 0 (0.0) 75 (0.01)
Antiviral drug treatment courses remaining 25 0
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Fig. 3. Outbreak curve of the calculated pandemic inﬂuenza outbreak in (a) Phichit province (n=554 112) and (b) Nakhon Si
Thammarat province (n=1 513 163) in Thailand, assuming available resources. The upper graphs show the total number of
symptomatic cases stratiﬁed by disease subgroups, the lower graphs show the hospitalized subgroups and the cumulative
number of deaths, respectively.
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116. The hospital capacity in terms of beds was suf-
ﬁcient to treat all admitted critical cases. However,
there was a shortage of medical ventilators which is
associated with 56 excess deaths (excluding those
who would die on ventilation anyway). The analysis
showed that 27 additional ventilators would be re-
quired to oﬀer ventilation to all cases in need. To treat
all critically ill patients with AVs, an extra stockpile
of 570 courses would be needed. Assuming that re-
sources could be increased to meet these needs, the
model predicted that the number of inﬂuenza-related
deaths could be reduced from 183 to 98; a 54% re-
duction (Table 1). A graphical representation of the
outbreak scenario is given in Figure 3b.
For the latter outbreak calculation, assuming suf-
ﬁcient resources, 66 physicians and 174 nurses would
be needed per day during the outbreak peak to treat
all hospitalized inﬂuenza cases. The estimated re-
source needs for hospital PPE would be about 8000
surgical masks, 2400 N95 respirators, and 10300 sur-
gical gloves.
Running the model for all provinces of Thailand
showed that the number of hospital beds was suf-
ﬁcient throughout the country. However, there was a
shortage of ventilators and AVs stockpiled for 35 and
40 provinces, respectively, with an associated excess
mortality of 579 and 583 deaths resulting from these,
respectively. Fifty-one provinces (67.1%) experienced
resource gaps in at least one resource and 24 prov-
inces (31.6%) experienced resource gaps in both
medical ventilators as well as AVs. The total shortfall
in number of ventilators was 318 (range 1–27, mean 9)
across the provinces. There was a shortage of 10 744
treatment courses with an average gap of 269 courses
(minimum 13, maximum 808) for each province with
an AV gap.
DISCUSSION
In order to support policy-making for pandemic pre-
paredness, information about eﬀective and economic
ways to improve health-service response is needed.
This is especially true for developing countries which
are often facing both limited outbreak response
capacities as well as limited ﬁnancial resources to im-
prove pandemic planning. Thus, recommendations
about where to invest ﬁnancial resources for optimum
public-health beneﬁts should guide pandemic policy-
making. The presented mathematical model provides
a means for identifying potential resource gaps as well
as high- and low-priority areas for resource allocation
and investment based on the disease burden which
can be prevented by improving features in health-
service response.
The analysis highlights the diﬀerences in health
outcomes between a province with adequate resources
and a province with potential resource gaps. For
Phichit province in Thailand, the analysis suggests
that the available hospital beds and the number of
medical ventilators are adequate for the outbreak
scenario simulated by the model. Also the AV stock-
pile is suﬃcient to treat all critical cases. However, the
surplus does not allow for changing treatment strat-
egies, e.g. by providing AVs to mild outpatients as
well. This would reduce both inﬂuenza-related com-
plications in cases as well as the total number of cases
generated throughout the outbreak. For Nakhon Si
Thammarat province the model showed that 56 excess
deaths can be prevented by increasing the number of
ventilators by 27, which is 27.3% of the number cur-
rently available. The AV stockpile must be more than
doubled in order to treat all hospitalized inﬂuenza
cases, which ultimately is predicted to prevent another
29 deaths. Running the model for all provinces in
Thailand showed that increasing the number of ven-
tilators and AV treatment courses to suﬃcient quan-
tities would reduce the number of deaths by 579 and
583, respectively. In both scenarios resources were
available to treat critical cases solely, which has
almost no eﬀect on preventing the amount of new
cases generated throughout the epidemic.
An earlier study on the Thai health system’s re-
sponse to contain a potential H5N1 inﬂuenza (bird
ﬂu) outbreak indicated that resource gaps already
existed during the early phases of a pandemic [20].
However, H5N1 is assumed to be more severe than
the currently spreading H1N1 virus causing a higher
disease burden and demanding greater health-service
capacity. In addition, the earlier study focuses on the
ability to contain H5N1 while we study the health-
service response to a milder H1N1 scenario.
Our model does not take into account options
for modifying or increasing health-service response
during the simulated outbreaks since the aim of our
study was to identify potential gaps on the basis of the
actual resources currently available. However, dif-
ferent options exist to modify responses during an
emerging health threat which should be considered in
pandemic response planning. In our study only the
use of spare capacity of the baseline capacity available
for case treatment was analysed. However, improving
surge capacity by re-allocating resources from elective
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non-essential functions or by applying clinical triage
guidelines, especially during outbreak peaks, would
improve outbreak response capacity during periods
of intense resource demand for the large number of
patients. Our study highlights the serious eﬀect of
shortages in ventilators on the expected number
of excess deaths. However, the use of medical venti-
lators is rarely an elective function, unless it is as-
sociated with post-operative recovery, and it can
seldom be postponed. One alternative option might be
to discontinue medical ventilation for those patients
not responding to treatment, in order to provide res-
piratory support to those who would beneﬁt most
[23]. However, such decisions have to follow clear tri-
age guidelines based on bioethical principles to secure
equitable and eﬃcient use of scarce resources and to
support clinical personnel in decision-making [24, 25].
A further option to improve outbreak response
would be the mobilization of resources. The current
analysis showed that resources are distributed diﬀer-
ently throughout Thailand. In total, 67% of the Thai
provinces are facing gaps in availability of medical
ventilators or AVs, while others are estimated to have
suﬃcient or even excess health-service resources to
deal with the pandemic scenario modelled in our
study. This diversity raises important implications
in terms of sharing resources for outbreak response
across geographical regions. To potentially draw
upon capacities from neighbouring regions, the re-
source availability throughout the country should be
analysed to identify geographic clusters of resource
gaps and surpluses. Including resource mobilization
strategies in national pandemic planning allows the
possibility of improving outbreak response without
necessarily increasing the quantities of health-service
resources.
Since the current model shows resource gaps and
the associated excess disease burden, further import-
ant questions remain about cost-eﬀective ways to in-
vest in improvement of health-service resources.
Apart from the health beneﬁt gained, information
about costs associated with resource improvement has
to be considered when making decisions about in-
vesting in health-service improvement. Hence, infor-
mation about the ﬁnancial impact of acquisition,
maintenance, and delivery of resources need to be
balanced with the disease burden which can be pre-
vented [26].
Due to simpliﬁed assumptions of the model and
inherent uncertainty surrounding the underlying dis-
ease parameter values, the estimated number of cases
and deaths as well as the extrapolated resource needs
should be interpreted with caution. The model ap-
plied here is an extended version of a deterministic
SEIR model that assumes a homogeneous mixing
pattern within a closed population. Incorporating
heterogeneities into the model would allow simulation
of a pattern of geographical spread throughout a re-
gion or obtaining of age-dependent results to stratify
resource needs by age groups. However, the data
required for such an analysis would be enormous;
data on contact patterns, especially for developing
countries, are limited.
Another limitation of the present model is the as-
sumption that all cases are equally infectious regard-
less of the severity group to which they belong, and
that the level of infectivity is constant throughout
the infectious period (although duration of in-
fectiousness is assumed to diﬀer between severity
classes). Epidemiological studies suggest that, in re-
ality, the degree of infectivity is associated with viral
load, which in turn varies with disease severity and
time post-infection [18].
The parameters used in our study are taken from
the literature. Diﬀerent parameters for pandemic
inﬂuenza are published and some of them vary sub-
stantially. This is especially the case during early
pandemic phases, as with the current H1N1v pan-
demic, when epidemiological data are limited and
of questionable reliability [27]. It has been shown
that simple mathematical outbreak models can be
useful tools to derive information about outbreak
progression when only limited epidemiological
data are available [28]. These models rely on few
basic parameters which can be simply changed if more
recent data become available. Nevertheless, it has to
be considered that changes in parameter settings or
the accumulation of parameter uncertainties can have
a huge impact on the model output with a strong ef-
fect on the underlying resource calculations, ranging
from suﬃcient resources to an overwhelmed health
system [9].
For the current study, disease- and resource-
related parameters were taken from various countries,
although most of them were derived from analyses
conducted in industrialized societies. However, dif-
ferences among countries in terms of behavioural,
cultural and socioeconomic characteristics, the under-
lying health of the population, and the quality and
accessibility of healthcare services, could inﬂuence
disease parameter estimates. Furthermore, for some
calculations, such as the number of healthcare
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personnel needed for case treatment, no data were
available and the model parameters had to be as-
sumed. However, parameterizing health data for
developing countries is a trade-oﬀ between what is
available and what is needed to conduct a robust
analysis [29]. There are many reasons for the under-
representation of research in developing countries,
ranging from poor research capacity to publication
bias of journals against so called ‘diseases of poverty’
[30]. This highlights the need to address such im-
balances in the availability and quality of data for
public-health research and policy-making, and also to
ﬁnd better ways to deal with scarce data in developing
countries.
Considering the simple nature of the model and
the uncertainty in the parameter settings, the aim of
the output is not to provide accurate information
on the exact quantities of resources needed. However,
the error introduced due to the simplicity of the
model acts similarly on all the resource calculations
and hence allows a comparative analysis of the eﬀects
of resource availability and the consequence of dif-
ferent strategies of resource use. This mathematical
model thus represents a means of prioritizing where
and how investments should be concentrated in order
to improve pandemic response programmes eﬀec-
tively.
CONCLUSION
The current mathematical model is a simple but
comprehensive and easy-to-use modelling tool for
calculating inﬂuenza outbreak progression and the
underlying health-service resource demands. It can be
applied for pandemic response planning to estimate
and compare health-system resource gaps across re-
source types and geographic areas, and to help prior-
itize where and which resources should be increased
or otherwise improved. This information is especially
useful for countries with limited capacity to improve
pandemic response as they rely on information to
focus eﬀorts on the most relevant resource gaps. The
mathematical model can be downloaded from the
AsiaFluCap project website at : www.asiaﬂucap.org.
NOTE
Supplementary material accompanies this paper on
the Journal’s website (http://journals.cambridge.org/
hyg).
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